UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

8-18-2016

State v. Arenas Respondent's Brief Dckt. 43751

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Arenas Respondent's Brief Dckt. 43751" (2016). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 6158.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6158

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
) No. 43751
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
) Blaine County Case No.
v.
) CR-2014-1813
)
OSVALDO GUADALUPE ARENAS,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
)
________________________
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF BLAINE
________________________
HONORABLE ROBERT J. ELGEE
District Judge
________________________

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate
Public Defender
P. O. Box 2816
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 334-2712

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1
Nature Of The Case ................................................................................... 1
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ........................ 1
ISSUE ................................................................................................................... 3
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 4
I.

Arenas’ Claim Is Moot ..................................................................... 4

II.

Arenas Has Failed To Show Error In The District
Court’s Determination That His Miranda Rights
Were Not Violated ........................................................................... 5
A.

Introduction ........................................................................... 5

B.

Standard Of Review.............................................................. 6

C.

The Officer’s Statement Was Not The
Functional Equivalent Of Express
Questioning ........................................................................... 6

CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 9
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................ 9

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

PAGE

Bradshaw v. State, 120 Idaho 429, 816 P.2d 986 (1991) ..................................... 4
Idaho Schools for Equal Educ. Opp. v. Idaho State Bd. of Educ.,
128 Idaho 276, 912 P.2d 644 (1996).......................................................... 4
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) .......................................................... 1, 6
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990) ........................................................ 7
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) .................................................. 6, 7, 8
State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 272 P.3d 417 (2010)........................................ 7
State v. Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 232 P.3d 327 (2010) ............................................. 4
State v. Kuzmichev, 132 Idaho 536, 976 P.2d 462 (1999) .................................... 6

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas appeals from his conviction for possession of
methamphetamine. He challenges the district court’s ruling that officers did not
violate his Miranda 1 rights.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Police arrested Arenas on an outstanding warrant. (R., p. 142.) Prior to
patting him down, an officer asked him “whether he had anything on him,” to
which Arenas answered, “‘no.’” (Id.) When the officer patted him down, he felt a
pipe in Arenas’ pocket, and stated, “‘I thought you had nothing on you dude.’”
(Id.) Arenas then identified the object found by the officer as “‘a meth pipe.’” (Id.)
A

search

of

Arenas’

car

revealed

additional

paraphernalia

and

methamphetamine. (R., pp. 142-43.) The officer then recited the Miranda rights
to Arenas who, in response to questioning, admitted “having baggies of
methamphetamine tucked inside his waistline.” (R., p. 143.) A more thorough
search of Arenas found the baggies of methamphetamine. (Id.)
The state charged Arenas with felony possession of methamphetamine
and misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. (R., pp. 55-56.) Arenas moved
to suppress “all evidence that was seized from the Defendant on or about July
31, 2014, and any evidence which is the fruit of that search.” (R., pp. 70-71, 7677.)

The district court granted the motion in part and denied it in part.

(R., pp. 139-58.)
1

Relevant to this appeal, the district court concluded that

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
1

Arenas’ statement that what the officer discovered during the pat down was “a
meth pipe” was not the result of an interrogation requiring Miranda warnings.
(R., pp. 152-53.)
After the district court entered its order denying the motion to suppress,
Arenas pled guilty to felony possession of methamphetamine. 2 (R., pp. 168-70.)
The

district

court

thereafter

entered

judgment

and

Arenas

appealed.

(R., pp. 175-81, 188-90.)

2

The record contains no disposition on the misdemeanor. There is a motion to
dismiss and an order granting dismissal in the record (R., pp. 165-66), but they
relate to a different case and were apparently misfiled.
2

ISSUE
Arenas states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied in part Mr. Arenas’s
motion to suppress?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
1.
Is Arenas’ challenge to the district court’s holding that his statement
acknowledging that the item found during the pat down was “a meth pipe” did not
violate his Miranda rights moot because it was relevant only to the paraphernalia
charge, and Arenas never pled guilty to that charge?
2.
Has Arenas failed to show error in the district court’s determination that his
Miranda rights were not violated?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
Arenas’ Claim Is Moot
The district court did not suppress evidence that police found baggies of
methamphetamine in Arenas’ possession; Arenas’ statements that he had
baggies of methamphetamine on his person; evidence that police found a
methamphetamine pipe on his person; or Arenas’ statements that the object
police found on him was a “meth pipe.” (R., pp. 157-58 (district court’s summary
of its findings and conclusions).) On appeal Arenas challenges only the denial of
suppression as to his statements concerning the “meth pipe.” (Appellant’s brief,
pp. 7-11.)

Because this statement was evidence only of the paraphernalia

charge, and Arenas did not plead guilty to the paraphernalia charge, this claim is
moot.
“An issue becomes moot if it does not present a real and substantial
controversy that is capable of being concluded by judicial relief.”

State v.

Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 8, 232 P.3d 327, 329 (2010) (citations omitted).

The

mootness doctrine precludes review when “the issues presented are no longer
live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.”

Idaho

Schools for Equal Educ. Opp. v. Idaho State Bd. of Educ., 128 Idaho 276, 281,
912 P.2d 644, 649 (1996) (quoting Bradshaw v. State, 120 Idaho 429, 432, 816
P.2d 986, 989 (1991)).
Arenas pled guilty only to the felony possession of methamphetamine
charge. (R., pp. 168-70.) On appeal he argues “Officer Ornelas’s statement was
aimed at Mr. Arenas and his knowledge of the pipe in his pocket.” (Appellant’s
4

brief, p. 10 (emphasis added).) Because the evidence Arenas claims the district
court should have suppressed is relevant to the paraphernalia charge (the “pipe
in his pocket”), and not relevant to the felony charge based on the subsequently
discovered baggies of methamphetamine on Arenas’ person, the claim on appeal
is moot.

II.
Arenas Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Determination That His
Miranda Rights Were Not Violated
A.

Introduction
After arresting Arenas, but before frisking him, Officer Ornelas twice asked

Arenas whether he “had anything on him” to which Arenas twice answered, “no.”
(R., p. 142.) During the pat down Officer Ornelas detected a pipe in Arenas’
pocket, and said, “I thought you had nothing on you dude.” (Id.) Arenas then
stated that what the officer had detected was a “meth pipe.” (Id.) The entire
exchange was conversational and not confrontational. (Exhibit B. 3) The district
court concluded that Arenas was not subject to interrogation in violation of his
Miranda rights. (R., pp. 152-53.) Specifically, the district court concluded the
statement, “I thought you had nothing on you dude,” after Officer Ornelas found
the pipe, was not “more likely to elicit an incriminating response than if the officer
had said ‘I know what that is.’" (R., p. 153.)
On appeal Arenas argues the “statement was reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response because it was directed at Mr. Arenas and in reaction to

3

The exchange between the officer and Arenas can be heard on Exhibit B. The
particular exchange is at about 8:12 to 8:30.
5

Mr. Arenas’s earlier claims that he had nothing on him.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 10.)
This argument fails because the statement was not the “functional equivalent” of
express questioning.

B.

Standard Of Review
“The determination of whether police were required to provide Miranda

warnings is a mixed one of law and fact. The trial court’s findings of fact
underlying the totality of the circumstances are reviewed for clear error, but
application of constitutional standards to those facts is given free review.” State
v. Kuzmichev, 132 Idaho 536, 542, 976 P.2d 462, 468 (1999).

C.

The Officer’s Statement Was Not The Functional Equivalent Of Express
Questioning
Warnings of certain rights must be provided before the police may engage

in custodial interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). For
purposes of Miranda, “interrogation” consists of “either express questioning or its
functional equivalent.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-301 (1980). The
“functional equivalent” of express questioning includes “any words or actions on
the part of the police … that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit
an incriminating response.” Id. at 301. “[S]ince the police surely cannot be held
accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the definition
of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers
that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response.” Id. at 301–02 (emphasis original). Analysis of what is the “functional
equivalent” of express questioning “focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the
6

suspect, rather than the intent of the police.” Id. See also State v. Adamcik,
152 Idaho 445, 470-72, 272 P.3d 417, 442-44 (2010) (applying Innis to conclude
that statements to defendant’s father, resulting in a dialogue between the father
and the defendant, were not interrogation).
The district court concluded that the statement, “I thought you had nothing
on you dude,” was not interrogation under Miranda. First, it was not express
questioning; rather, it was a statement.

Second, review of Supreme Court

precedent shows the single statement was not the “functional equivalent” of
express questioning.
In Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990), the Supreme Court of the
United States confronted a lower court decision that statements by a defendant
about why he was having trouble performing field sobriety tests should be
suppressed as the product of a Miranda violation. The Court concluded the
officer’s instructions regarding the tests and how to perform them “were not likely
to be perceived as calling for any verbal response and therefore were not ‘words
or actions’ constituting custodial interrogation.”

Id. at 603.

“Hence, Muniz’s

incriminating utterances during this phase of the videotaped proceedings were
‘voluntary’ in the sense that they were not elicited in response to custodial
interrogation.” Id. at 604.
In Innis, 446 U.S. at 303, Innis told police officers where he had
abandoned a gun after the officers made “a few off hand remarks” that it would
be a shame if a handicapped child from a nearby school should encounter the
firearm and hurt herself. “It cannot be said, in short, that Patrolmen Gleckman

7

and McKenna should have known that their conversation was reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response from the respondent.” Id. at 302.
Here Officer Ornelas’ single statement, “I thought you had nothing on you
dude,” made after discovery and identification of the methamphetamine pipe,
was neither reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response nor reasonably
perceived by Arenas as calling for a verbal response. The statement did not
directly or indirectly ask Arenas to identify the nature of the pipe Officer Ornelas
had just found. Arenas merely volunteered that information.
Arenas argues that “Officer Ornelas was expressing to Mr. Arenas that he
lied to him about the items on his person” and therefore “should have known that
his accusation was reasonably likely to elicit a response by Mr. Arenas admitting
his knowledge of the pipe.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 10.) The logic behind this
argument is flawed, however.
First, the initial premise—that Officer Ornelas was effectively accusing
Arenas of lying—is contrary to the factual findings of the district court, which are
supported by substantial competent evidence in the form of the recording of the
encounter. Arenas’ argument thus fails.
Second, even if the initial premise were true, Arenas has failed to show
how accusing Arenas of lying was either calculated by the officer or perceived by
Arenas as asking for a verbal response regarding the nature of the object just
found. On the contrary, even if Arenas’ postulated initial premise were sound, it
leads only to the conclusion that it invited a response as to the accusation of
lying. The statement, “You lied” does not invite the response, “That’s a meth

8

pipe.” The district court correctly concluded that the statement that the object
was a “meth pipe” was volunteered and was not the product of the functional
equivalent of express questioning.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Arenas’ judgment of
conviction.
DATED this 18th day of August, 2016.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen____________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 18th day of August, 2016, served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an
electronic copy to:
JENNY C. SWINFORD
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen___________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
KKJ/dd
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